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Abstract
This paper discusses some distinct￿but related￿psychological concepts which are relevant to de-
sign for behaviour change, but of which some, at least, do not necessarily fall within the scope of
‘conventional’ interaction design. They may fall super￿cially along the cognitive blade of Simon’s
scissors (1990), dealing with users’ thought processes rather than the contextual interaction environ-
ment itself, but the interaction of meaning and form demonstrated by product semantics (section
2.1) makes it clear that cognition depends on context: the scissors must work together. While design
for emotion (Desmet and Hekkert, 2009) is enjoying increasing attention and practical application,
including in behaviour change applications (e.g. Visser et al, 2011), in￿uencing and supporting mo-
tivation through design is underexplored except by a few pioneers such as Bisset (2010), while the
complexity of work on attitudes and persuasion has not necessarily lent itself to practical design
applications to the extent that it might. Nevertheless, much public discourse on behaviour change
persists with a preoccupation with measuring and ‘changing’ attitudes.
1 Attitudes, behaviour and persuasion
An assumption often found in the literature on behaviour (and in￿uencing it) is that attitudes are
the main determinant of behaviour, and that they precede behaviours. ‘Changing minds’ will lead to
‘changing deeds’; attitude change is to some extent con￿ated with behaviour change. Petty and Cacioppo
(1981, p.7) note ￿the presumed ability of attitudes to direct (and thus allow prediction of) behaviours.￿
Attitudes ￿tend to be conceived as the product of a deliberative calculation weighing an individual’s
beliefs about a behaviour with the value they attach to those characteristics￿ (Darnton, 2008, p.12).
Beliefs themselves are ￿information that a person has about other people, objects and issues. The
information may be factual or it may only be one person’s opinion￿ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, p.7).
A primary di￿culty with researching attitudes is that while behaviour can be observed, measuring
attitudes tends to rely either on asking people directly to self-report (so-called direct procedures), or
indirect procedures such as ‘disguised’ self-reports, where ￿people provide verbal reports about them-
selves, but they are unaware that the purpose of the self-report is to measure their attitudes￿ (Petty
and Cacioppo, 1981, p. 16), inferring attitudes from observed behaviour, or measuring physiological
1responses to attitude-related stimuli. None of these methods necessarily provides evidence of the ‘real’
attitude.
Winter and Koger (2004, p.59-60), speci￿cally considering attitudes towards the environment, suggest
that ￿[w]e think we recycle cans because we believe it is important to save resources; if someone told
us we think it is important to save resources because we recycle cans, we would think that explanation
was bizarre... [yet] research on the relation between environmental attitudes and behaviours has shown
inconsistent results. Sometimes pro-environmental attitudes correlate with pro-environmental behaviour
(e.g., people who think recycling is important are more likely to recycle). Sometimes pro-environmental
attitudes are unrelated to behaviour (e.g., people who think use of fossil fuels should be reduced do not
necessarily drive less than others).￿
1.1 Correspondence between attitudes and behaviours
One condition where attitudes and behaviours do appear to be more closely correlated is how speci￿c the
attitudes and behaviours compared are. Ajzen and Fishbein (1977, p.889) de￿ne attitudes and behaviours
as comprising four elements: ￿the action, the target at which the action is directed, the context in which
the action is performed, and the time at which it is performed.￿ By specifying each of these elements,
a behaviour or the attitude towards it can be described at a level where there is found to be a greater
correspondence between attitudes and behaviours: for example, someone’s attitude towards turning down
the thermostat set-point in early spring is likely to be more correlated with that actual behaviour ￿than
a general concern about environmental problems correlates with a variety of conservation behaviours￿
(Winter and Koger, 2004, p.60).
A related concept here is Thłgersen and Crompton’s (2009, p.154) recommendation to make connec-
tions between di￿erent pro-environmental behaviours more explicit to drive positive spillover: ￿positive
spillover is most likely between pairs of pro-environmental behaviours that are reasonably similar, or that
are perceived as being reasonably similar￿, which suggests that from a design perspective, portraying
new behaviours as being ‘like’ existing familiar ones in some way might be e￿ective. Thłgersen and
Crompton (2009) also suggest that users’ taxonomic categories are important here￿how people categor-
ise and group di￿erent kinds of behaviours. In a design sense, use of metaphors in particular could help
people construct new mental models and ‘behaviour categories’.
1.2 Which way around?
Bem’s self-perception theory (1972, p.2) suggests that ￿[i]ndividuals come to ‘know’ their own attitudes,
emotions and other internal states partially from inferring them from observations of their own overt
behaviour and/or the circumstances in which this behaviour occurs￿. That is, attitudes can be a result
of behaviours, rather than the other way around. Cognitive dissonance theory (e.g. Festinger et al, 1956;
Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) o￿ers an explanation of the same phenomenon, via the mechanism of
people rationalising their beliefs or attitudes to reduce the uncomfortable tension caused by holding or
by implication holding dissonant or con￿icting beliefs.
The notion of behaviours a￿ecting attitudes has resonance in a design context. Aside from deliberately
provoking cognitive dissonance in an attempt to change attitudes, there are opportunities where redesign
of products and services could directly lead to behaviour changes without depending on any shifts in
public attitudes as a precursor, but potentially leading to ￿changing people’s environmental attitudes
more generally [as a result]. People may recycle simply as a result of changes in municipal waste collection
services, without ever having decided that ‘recycling is a good thing’. But once they start recycling, some
people will infer from this that they are (to some extent) ‘green’. The possibility that this new attitude
2will ‘spill over’ into other behaviours is an intriguing one￿ (Jackson, 2005, p.viii). 1
1.3 TRA, TPB, TIB and other models
Returning speci￿cally to attitudes preceding behaviour, two of the most widely cited models here are
Ajzen and Fishbein’s Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; 1975) and Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour
(TPB; 1985). These models make use of the idea of ‘behavioural intention’, resulting from both attitudes
and subjective norms￿what it is perceived that others will think of a behaviour￿as a precursor to actual
behaviour. In Ajzen (1985) the factor of ‘perceived behavioural control’ was added, drawing on Bandura’s
(1977) concept of self-e￿cacy, to take account of the degree of control someone believes he or she has
over a situation. The general sequence of both TRA and TPB is that a person’s attitude towards a
behaviour, subjective norms (and in TPB, perceived behavioural control)￿all drawing on the person’s
beliefs￿are combined in a weighted sum (with the weightings empirically determined) which comprises
the intention. The behaviour will then occur when the opportunity exists.
Abraham and Michie (2008, p.382) list three techniques which draw on TPB (and are consistent
with TRA) which could all be applied in a design context: ￿Provide information on consequences...
Information about the bene￿ts and costs of action or inaction, focusing on what will happen if the person
does or does not perform the behaviour; Provide information about others’ approval... Information
about what others think about the person’s behaviour and whether others will approve or disapprove
of any proposed behaviour change; Prompt intention formation... Encouraging the person to decide to
act or set a general goal, for example, to make a behavioural resolution such as ‘I will take more exercise
next week’.￿
1.3.1 The incompleteness of TRA and TPB
While techniques drawing on the models are commonly used in health-related behaviour change inter-
ventions (e.g. as reviewed by Abraham and Michie, 2008), from an interaction design point of view,
the emphasis on intentions and ‘planned’ behaviour rather than situational factors suggests that models
such as these do not provide a complete picture (compare Suchman (1987/2007)).
Environmental context factors such as a￿ordances and constraints are conceivably covered by the
‘perceived behavioural control’ element of TPB, if the user is accurately aware of them in advance and
incorporates them into his or her intentions (i.e. if ‘actual behavioural control’ equates to the ‘perceived
behavioural control’), but the ways in which people may inventively or apparently spontaneously perceive
a￿ordances or opportunities for new behaviours in their environment (e.g. as illustrated by Fulton Suri
and ideo (2005) and Brandes and Erlho￿ (2006))￿and make use of them￿do not appear to be covered
by TPB or TRA2. It could be argued that variables such as ‘skills’ and ‘resources’, important in human
factors treatments of behaviour, are also included in the perceived behavioural control component but
the model does not provide any information on the decision processes within this component: how do
people make decisions (if they do) about whether given the abilities they have, and the a￿ordances o￿ered
by the environment, they perform one action or another? Jackson (2005) notes that TPB also does not
directly o￿er insights into how habits, morals or emotions a￿ect behaviour.
There is also the matter of choice among alternatives, something common to many interaction design
situations. Sheppard et al (1988, p.327) note that it is di￿cult to apply TRA (and by extension TPB)
in situations where because
1There is perhaps a parallel here with the ‘trimtab’ approach favoured by Buckminster Fuller, in particular in the form
expressed in a 1966 interview with the New Yorker: ￿I made up my mind... that I would never try to reform man￿that’s
much too di￿cult. What I would do was to try to modify the environment in such a way as to get man moving in preferred
directions￿ (Krausse and Lichtenstein, 2001, p.17).
2Given the ’planned’ in the name TPB, this is perhaps only to be expected.
3￿many of the attributes and consequences associated with various alternatives in the choice set
are apt to be quite similar, the attitudes and subjective norms toward each of the alternatives
also are likely to be similar. Consider, for example, the consumer who thinks that buying
a package of Oscar Mayer hot dogs is a terri￿c idea. S/he is likely to have similar thoughts
about buying Ball Park, Beef Masters, or Hebrew National hot dogs. However, only one
package of hot dogs actually will be purchased. In the case of the chosen alternative, our
consumer’s positive attitude and subjective norm is consistent with his/her purchase but not
for each rejected alternative (i.e., for each rejected alternative, the attitudes and subjective
norms are positive, but the behaviour is not performed).￿
1.3.2 TIB and other models
It is outside the scope of this review to consider in detail all the numerous theories and models of
behaviour that have been developed in di￿erent branches of psychology, but the Theory of Interpersonal
Behaviour (TIB; Triandis, 1977, cited in, e.g., Jackson, 2005 and Darnton, 2008) deserves mention as
it includes explicit recognition of habits (driven by past experience) alongside attitudes, social factors
(including norms and roles), emotions and contextual facilitating conditions in determining behaviour.
Although referring to interpersonal behaviour rather than interaction with objects and environments,
TIB encompasses enough variables to suggest a fairly comprehensive account of human behaviour. As
Jackson (2005, p.95) puts it,
￿my behaviour in any particular situation is, according to Triandis, a function partly of what
I intend, partly of my habitual responses, and partly of the situational constraints and condi-
tions under which I operate. My intentions in their turn are in￿uenced by social, normative
and a￿ective factors as well as by rational deliberations. I am neither fully deliberative, in
Triandis’ model, nor fully automatic. I am neither fully autonomous nor entirely social. My
behaviours are in￿uenced by my moral beliefs, but the impact of these is moderated both by
my emotional drives and my cognitive limitations.￿
Models of behaviour and behaviour change range from the elaborate and complex (e.g. Howard and
Sheth, 1969, or Bagozzi et al, 2002, cited in Jackson, 2005) to the very simple (e.g. Fogg, 2009).
Some of the most comprehensive models edge into the territory of system dynamics, with multiple
nested feedback loops. For example, the UK government’s Foresight Programme’s (2007) model of the
factors (including many behavioural factors) a￿ecting obesity includes ￿108 variables, some of which are
measurable (e.g., the ambient temperature of the indoor environment), and other variables that are more
di￿cult to quantify (e.g., desire to di￿erentiate food o￿erings). The relationships between the variables
are illustrated with >300 solid or dashed lines to indicate positive and negative in￿uences. All the
variables are interconnected￿ (Finegood et al, 2010). The approach taken in the author’s work on Design
with Intent is to try to extract elements from models and di￿erent disciplinary perspectives which are
potentially useful or applicable in a design context: admittedly, sidestepping the issue of which models
are really most predictive of behaviour.
1.4 Central and peripheral persuasion
The concept of persuasion is important to discussions of attitudes and behaviour. Fogg’s use of the
term persuasive technology and the ￿eld that has developed as a result will be covered in a forthcoming
working paper, but it is useful to consider persuasion here, in the context of attitudes and how persuasive
messages are constructed and delivered.
4Classical rhetoric, ￿the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion￿ (Ar-
istotle, c.350 BC), is often taken to involve three ‘appeals’: the rationality of the argument itself ( logos),
the credibility (ethos) of the speaker, and the appeal to emotions ( pathos), or in Cicero’s terminology of
250 years later, ￿the task of informing ( docere), the task of establishing the speaker’s personal credibility
(conciliare), and the task of involving the feelings of the listeners ( movere)￿ (Christensen and Hasle,
2007, p.307). Much 20th century research on how persuasion occurs, such as the Yale Communication
and Attitude Change Program (Hovland et al, 1953) has made use of similar concepts. For example,
the concept of source credibility has been widely studied in the context of websites (e.g., Fogg, 2003;
Cugelman et al, 2008).
Petty and Cacioppo’s elaboration likelihood model (ELM; 1981) proposes two ‘routes’ through which
persuasion can be e￿ected. The elaboration likelihood is essentially ￿how likely is it that the...person
will be motivated and able to think about the message [being presented]?￿ (p. 268). If the likelihood
is high￿the audience motivated and able to think￿it is worth trying to pursue the ‘central route’,
presenting an argued explanation of why the message is correct. For this to work, ￿[t]he message recip-
ient attends to the message arguments, attempts to understand them, and then evaluates them. Some
arguments lead to favorable thoughts, whereas others lead to counterarguments. The person then in-
tegrates all of this information into a coherent and reasoned position... [F]or the most part, under the
central route, persuasion is based on a thoughtful consideration of the object or issue at hand￿ (p.256).
This would appear to correspond most closely with Aristotle’s logos.
On the other hand, Petty and Cacioppo’s ‘peripheral route’￿to use if the elaboration likelihood is
judged to be low, or if the actual message being presented is weaker￿involves persuasion that occurs
through less thought, attention or e￿ort on the part of the persuadee: ￿persuasion is determined by
simple cues, such as the attractiveness of the communicator, whether or not the people around you
agree with the position presented, or the pleasure or pain associated with agreeing with the position,
or whether a reason is given (no matter how bogus) for complying with a request￿ (Pratkanis and
Aronson, 2007, p.35). A number of the cues involved in peripheral route persuasion seem to accord with
cognitive biases, heuristics, shortcuts and social proof (see forthcoming working papers) and ‘persuasion’
via operant conditioning (see Lockton 2011), and indeed probably the majority of the techniques used
in advertising, for example. Petty and Cacioppo (1981, p.263) suggest that ￿if the new attitude results
from e￿ortful issue-relevant cognitive ability (central route), the new attitude is likely to be relatively
enduring. But if the new attitude results from various persuasion cues in the situation (peripheral route),
the attitude change is likely to exist only so long as the cues remain salient.￿
Thus, for longer-term, enduring attitude change (which may lead to behaviour change), central route
persuasion is the usual route 3. Shorter-term attitude change may be elicited via the peripheral route,
but will ￿tend to decay unless the new attitude is subsequently bolstered by issue-relevant thought￿
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, p.268). As Jackson (2005, p.108) points out, the peripheral route can also
lead directly to behaviour change￿￿a target responding to... celebrity involvement [e.g. a celebrity
endorsement of an activity, or a celebrity delivering the message] may ￿nd themselves taking public
transport without ever having deliberated over the choice. Once the behaviour in question has changed,
the target begins to consider the advantages of public transport and adjust their attitudes accordingly.￿
3As an additional consideration, Schwarz (2002, p.543) cites studies suggesting that ￿sad individuals are more likely
to engage in spontaneous message elaboration than happy individuals... [They] are strongly in￿uenced by compelling
arguments and not in￿uenced by weak arguments, whereas happy individuals are moderately, but equally, in￿uenced by
both. Therefore, a strong message fares better with a sad than with a happy audience, but if communicators have nothing
compelling to say they better put recipients into a good mood.￿
51.5 Implications for designers
 There is often an assumption that attitudes are the main determinant of behaviours, and that
they precede behaviours, but this is not necessarily the case￿attitudes can also be the result
of behaviours. Thus while design for attitude change may lead to behaviour change, design for
behaviour change may also lead to attitude change.
 As well as deliberately provoking cognitive dissonance in an attempt to change attitudes, redesign
could directly lead to behaviour changes, potentially shifting public attitudes as a result.
 From a design perspective, portraying new behaviours as being ‘like’ existing familiar ones (perhaps
metaphorically) might be e￿ective in driving a ‘positive spillover’ e￿ect.
 Three techniques drawing on the Theory of Planned Behaviour applicable in a design context are
providing information on consequences and others’ approval, and prompting intention formation.
 However, TPB’s emphasis on intentions and ‘planned’ behaviour rather than situational factors
suggests that it does not provide a complete picture in an interaction design context. TIB o￿ers a
more comprehensive model, with each element￿social, a￿ective and rational factors, habits, and
situational constraints￿potentially addressable via design.
 Design can address either peripheral or central route persuasion. Although the central route is
more usually associated with longer-term, enduring attitude change, the peripheral route can lead
directly to behaviour change.
2 Meaning and emotion
Krippendor￿ (2006) provides an introduction to the study of product semantics￿that is, ￿how people
attribute meanings to artefacts and interact with them accordingly￿ and, simultaneously, a ￿vocabulary
and methodology for designing artefacts in view of the meanings they could acquire for their users and
the communities of their stakeholders￿ (p.2). There is insu￿cient space here to provide a full treatment
of the ￿eld, which has many implications for designers in general 4, but some of the elements of product
semantics which Krippendor￿ describes could have direct relevance for in￿uencing user behaviour.
2.1 In￿uencing behaviour through product semantics
Aside from a discussion of a￿ordances, constraints and di￿erent kinds of feedback (covered in Lockton,
2012), Krippendor￿ (2006) deals with some concepts particularly applicable to in￿uencing behaviour,
including: the intentional use of visual metaphors to enable users to understand a ’new’ product in the
way that they understood a previous one￿￿Key to most visual metaphors is the resemblance of one or
more parts of an artefact with objects in a familiar empirical domain, the source domain of the metaphor,
from which desirable meanings are imported￿ (p.97); deliberate use of discontinuity in the appearance
(e.g. colour or form) of a product or interface to draw attention to the di￿erence in function and meaning
between elements￿￿users are always inclined to ’￿nd its reason￿’ (p.104); the use of maps of possibilities
to ￿present the space within which users can navigate their interface with an artefact￿ (p.125); the use of
semantic layers to reveal di￿erent ’meanings’ as appropriate to users at di￿erent times and in di￿erent
4Krippendor￿ distinguishes product semantics from the ￿ontological schizophrenia of semiotics￿ (2006, p.274), which in
his conception, by separating signs and their referents, ￿divert[s] attention from the meaning of artefacts￿ (p.273). This
paper has avoided a treatment of semiotics, since although undoubtedly relevant to interaction design (e.g. de Souza, 2005),
the terminology and approach used have made it di￿cult, in this author’s eyes at least, to extract practically applicable
insights for design that are not already adequately covered by other disciplinary perspectives.
6contexts; and the use of form to help reveal ’how products work’ where this understanding is important
to users (Krippendor￿ uses the Dyson vacuum cleaner’s transparent dust canister as an example. 5
Some elements which can be considered part of product semantics have received considerable attention
in areas of psychology outside design. For example, Rozin and Nemero￿ (2002) have studied what they
term a ‘law of similarity’, essentially that ￿appearance equals reality,￿ via ￿ndings such as subjects’
reluctance to eat sugar from a bottle onto which they had just themselves placed a label saying sodium
cyanide, poison, or the fact that subjects ￿were disinclined to put in their mouth a fake vomit, clearly
made of rubber, in comparison to their willingness to put in their mouth a ￿at rubber sink stopper of
about the same size￿ (Rozin and Nemero￿, 2002, p.205). They make the point (p.204) that ￿[t]he idea
that appearance equals reality is eminently reasonable because, in the world we evolved in, causes often
do resemble e￿ects, and most things that look like tigers are tigers... However, this generally useful
heuristic becomes more of a bias in the worlds created by cultures, which invariably include art, symbolic
language, and images.￿
One of the most fundamental elements of product semantics is the use of colour: how colour is used
by designers not only to signify meaning but to attract and repel, connote particular themes or moods,
and evoke ways of thinking or acting, and indeed how this can vary across cultures. Again, there is not
scope here for a detailed review, but it is worth considering brie￿y how some aspects have been used to
in￿uence behaviour. For example, Soldat et al (1997; cited in Schwarz, 2002, p.546) found that reasoning
tests presented to subjects on di￿erent coloured paper￿‘upbeat’ red or ‘depressed’ blue￿led to test
performances indicative of di￿erent styles of cognitive processing (similar to the elaboration likelihood
model￿see section 1.4): ￿Paralleling the e￿ects of happy and sad moods, they observed that upbeat colors
fostered heuristic processing, whereas more depressing colors fostered systematic processing, resulting in
di￿erential performance on the... tasks.￿
Goldacre (2008, p.67-68) discusses a study involving the use of di￿erent coloured pills: ￿Blackwell [et
al, 1972] did a set of experiments on 57 college students [who] were given either one or two [sugar] pills,
which were either pink or blue. They were told that they could expect to receive either a stimulant or a
sedative... Afterwards, when they measured alertness... the researchers found that two pills were more
e￿ective than one... The pink sugar tablets were better at maintaining concentration than the blue
ones. Since colours in themselves have no intrinsic pharmacological properties, the di￿erence in e￿ect
could only be due to the cultural meanings of pink and blue: pink is alerting, blue is cool.￿
It is too strong to assert that ￿pink is alerting￿ in general; for example, Schauss (1985) discusses
the use of ’Baker-Miller pink’, a particular shade of paint developed for use in prisons and psychiatric
facilities, which is claimed to have a measurable, if short-term, e￿ect on ￿reducing physiological variables
associated with aggression￿ (p.55)￿the so-called ’drunk tank pink’. It is unclear the extent to which these
kinds of e￿ects would be generalisable in product design.
2.2 Portions and the unit bias
As aspect related to Krippendor￿’s discussion of discontinuities is work on cognitive biases relating to
portions￿related to much of the work on framing discussed in a forthcoming working paper. The unit
bias (Geier et al, 2006) suggests that (within limits) people will often perceive whatever size of portion
of food they are presented with as being the correct ’unit’ to consume, and act accordingly. For example,
Wansink et al (2005) used secretly self-re￿lling bowls of soup to investigate ￿whether visual cues related
to portion size can in￿uence intake volume without altering either estimated intake or satiation￿, ￿nding
that ￿[p]articipants who were unknowingly eating from self-re￿lling bowls ate more soup... than those
5This example has also been incorporated into v.1.0 of the Design with Intent toolkit as the pattern transparency
(Lockton et al, 2010).
7eating from normal soup bowls. However, despite consuming 73% more, they did not believe they had
consumed more, nor did they perceive themselves as more sated than those eating from normal bowls.￿
(p.93).
The implication is that designing the packaging of food or other goods to provide particular portion
sizes could be an intervention to help in￿uence healthier consumption; related research includes Hsee’s
(1998) ￿ndings that people were willing to pay more for 7 oz of ice cream over￿lling a 5 oz container
than 8 oz of ice cream ‘under￿lling’ a 10 oz container (when presented separately): the perception of
value was such that a ‘generous’ portion was considered more valuable than a ‘mean’ one, even though
the actual amount of ice cream was less in the generous case. This (perhaps commonsense) ￿nding adds
an additional twist to the designer’s possible treatment of portions: make it look generous, perhaps by
using an intentionally undersized container.
Thaler (1999) discusses related aspects of portion sizing in the context of self-control and mental
accounting: for ￿tempting products, consumers may regulate their consumption in part by buying small
quantities at a time, thus keeping inventories low. This practice creates the odd situation where con-
sumers may be willing to pay a premium for a smaller quantity￿. Wertenbroch (1998) investigates this
phenomenon further, ￿nding that ￿consumers voluntarily and strategically ration their purchase quantit-
ies of goods that are likely to be consumed on impulse and that therefore may pose self-control problems.
For example, many regular smokers buy their cigarettes by the pack, although they could easily a￿ord to
buy 10-pack cartons. These smokers knowingly forgo sizable per-unit savings from quantity discounts,
which they could realize if they bought cartons; by rationing their purchase quantities, they also self-
impose additional transaction costs on marginal consumption, which makes excessive smoking overly
di￿cult and costly￿ (p.317).
2.3 Design for emotion
Elements of product semantics adopted in industry often relate to provoking emotional or a￿ective
responses from users6, or satisfying emotional needs when they have been uncovered through market
research￿part of what Jordan (2000) calls ￿designing pleasurable products￿ rather than simply meeting
basic functionality and usability needs. Crilly et al (2004) consider ￿consumer response to product
visual form￿ to be ￿the ￿nal stage in a process of communication between the design team and the
consumer￿￿an approach which lends itself to investigations such as Mugge’s (2011) study of ￿the e￿ect
of a business-like personality in product appearance [i.e. angular, formal styling and interfaces￿in this
case of CD players] on the perceived performance quality of the product￿.
In HCI, the ￿eld of a￿ective computing (Picard, 1997) covers the development of computer systems
which make use of emotion, both recognising it and emulating it (enabling ’empathy’); many projects
in Persuasive Technology (see forthcoming working paper) come into this category, where computers
become ’social actors’ (Reeves and Nass, 1996), to which users respond with similar emotions as they do
with human interaction.
Kansei engineering (Nagamachi, 1995) is de￿ned as ￿translating... a consumer’s feeling and image
for a product into design elements￿ (p.3), and has been widely used in Japan, for example in the design
of the Mazda mx-5 sports car. Kansei engineering aims to ￿capture and convert subjective and even
unconscious feelings about a product into concrete design parameters￿ (Sch￿tte, 2005, p.i), mainly visual
elements of form7 but also other sensory aspects such as sound, smell and the feel of materials and action
6Attempting to elicit emotional states through technology are, of course, not unique to product design. Clynes (1977)
o￿ers an intriguing perspective on communicating emotional states from one person to another via sound or physical
movements.
7Perceptual phenomena in psychology such as the ’ bouba/kiki e￿ect’ (K￿hler, 1930, p.186￿originally the maluma/takete
e￿ect; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001), where participants from many di￿erent cultures and with many languages
largely agree that a spiky shape is likely to be called ’kiki’ (or ’takete’) and a rounded shape ’bouba’ (or ’maluma’) seem
8of moving parts. Among others, de Botton (2006) applies some similar ideas to a discussion of emotion
in architectural design.
Similar work is being done on emotional design or design for emotion; Desmet (2002) developed
PrEmo, a ￿product emotion measurement instrument￿ in which animated characters displaying di￿erent
emotions enable users to rate products or images of products for the emotions they provoke. Desmet’s
contention is that ￿in spite of... interpersonal di￿erences, the process of emotion, i.e. the way in which
emotions are elicited, is universal￿ (p.106); the emotions elicited by a product are caused by an auto-
matic, subconscious appraisal of a product’s personal signi￿cance, and so concentrating on understanding
patterns in this appraisal process can help designers elicit the emotions they intend. This automatic ap-
praisal process is related to the a￿ect heuristic (Slovic et al, 2002, p.397): ￿that is, representations of
objects and events in people’s minds are tagged to varying degrees with a￿ect. In the process of making
a judgment or decision, people consult or refer to an ‘a￿ect pool’ containing all the positive and negative
tags consciously or unconsciously associated with the representations.￿
2.4 Implications for designers
 At the intersection of context and cognition, product semantics concerns how users read meaning
into the products they use, and hence interact with them accordingly
 Visual metaphors or intentional similarity can enable users to understand a ’new’ product in the
way that they understood a previous one
 Colour can be used to signify meaning or to connote moods
 Discontinuity in appearance can draw attention to di￿erences in function between elements
 Strategic use of portions or size framing could in￿uence quantity of consumption
 Maps of possibilities can show users the behaviours available
 ’Semantic layers’ can reveal di￿erent meanings as appropriate in di￿erent contexts, perhaps reveal-
ing ’how products work’ where understanding is important to behaviour
 Design for emotion and a￿ective computing deal with both recognising users’ emotional responses
and responding to, emulating or eliciting them appropriately, where computers or products become
’social actors’
 There is the potential to in￿uence user behaviour via emotional interaction, e.g. through empathy
(displaying or engendering) or through triggering particular associations or personal signi￿cance
for users
3 Motivation
Motivation has been touched on in discussing central route persuasion (section 1.4), but deserves some
further treatment. Terms such as enthusiasm or gumption (Pirsig, 1974) may be partly analogous in this
context. Ryan and Deci (2000, p.54) de￿ne motivation thus: ￿To be motivated means to be moved to
do something. A person who feels no impetus or inspiration to act is thus characterized as unmotivated,
whereas someone who is energized or activated toward an end is considered motivated.￿
highly relevant here.
93.1 Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
The basic distinction commonly drawn is between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: intrinsic ￿refers
to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable,￿ while extrinsic ￿refers to doing
something because it leads to a separable outcome￿ (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p.55). Extrinsic motivation
often implies the promise of rewards (or avoiding punishment), and thus has some parallels with aspects
of operant conditioning where the reinforcers are clearly external (Lockton, 2011) and peripheral route
persuasion (section 1.4), particularly the shorter-term level of engagement which results.
As part of self-determination theory, Deci and Ryan (1985) suggest that humans have innate needs
related to intrinsic motivation: competence, autonomy and social relatedness, each of which may be
salient at di￿erent times and in di￿erent circumstances. Competence here is ￿the capacity for e￿ective
interactions with the environment￿ (Deci and Ryan, 1985, p.27), and the belief in the ability to do
so, somewhat parallel to Bandura’s self-e￿cacy (1977) or perhaps Ajzen’s perceived/actual behavioural
control (1985); autonomy ￿is di￿erent from independence... [i]t means acting with choice￿which means
we can be both autonomous and happily interdependent with others￿ (Pink, 2010, p.90); while relatedness
refers to the need to belong or to feel part of a community with others.
Ryan and Deci (2000, p.64) suggest that relatedness can help in shifting motivations from extrinsic
to intrinsic: ￿the groundwork for facilitating internalization is providing a sense of belongingness and
connectedness to the persons, group, or culture disseminating a goal.￿
Other elements of self-determination theory include a number of sub-theories dealing with di￿erent
motivational phenomena, including internalisation of extrinsic motivation. Pink (2010), reframes the
three ‘motivation needs’ somewhat di￿erently, as mastery (instead of competence), autonomy and pur-
pose, the last of these providing a context for the autonomy and mastery, ￿a sense of doing something
beyond themselves￿ (attributed to an interview with Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi: Pink, 2010, p.134). As
such, he o￿ers a potential ‘checklist’ for designers seeking to increase intrinsic motivation via a product
or service.
The conversion or reframing of extrinsic to intrinsic motivation￿a goal inherent to many game-based
behaviour change interventions, for example￿is an idea which Pink (2010) calls the ‘Sawyer e￿ect’,
after the idea demonstrated in Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, where by reframing the
extrinsically motivated task of whitewashing his aunt’s fence￿work￿as something intrinsically motiv-
ated￿play￿he makes it seem desirable enough for his friends to want to do it, indeed ‘pay’ to do
it.
The opposite case￿turning ‘play’ into ‘work’￿is also seen. For example, Lepper et al (1973, p.129)
found that children ￿showing intrinsic interest￿ in using felt-tips to draw in their free time, if o￿ered a
‘Good Player Award’ (a coloured card with the child’s name and school alongside a gold star and red
ribbon) for their drawing, subsequently ￿showed less... intrinsic interest in the target activity￿ than
children who had not been o￿ered the award or who had been given it unexpectedly without previously
being aware of its existence.
3.2 Intrinsically motivating design
Bisset (2010) is exploring the potential of ‘intrinsically motivating design’ for socially bene￿cial behaviour
change via services and products, with the designer helping support the user’s motivation: ￿One way
of conceptualising the role of a designer in this situation is by comparison with a sports coach or ￿lm
director, working with the athlete or actor, supporting and guiding him towards reaching your shared
performance goals, or in less ambitious cases, simply ensuring that they do not produce a low-quality
performance￿ (Bisset, 2010, p.303-5).
In an article co-written with the author (Bisset and Lockton, 2010), focusing on service design,
10Bisset notes some of the challenges and opportunities involved, for example how ￿the concept of ‘design
for motivation’ is perhaps something of a Catch-22￿design to control user behaviour too closely and
you’ll constrain users’ sense of autonomy. On the other hand, design with too many options or encourage
responsibility in users too early and without su￿cient support, and you’ll create an equally demotivating
experience￿ (Bisset and Lockton, p.16). Participatory design or co-design can allow designers ￿to see
what it is that motivates our customers and embody those values ourselves (at least for the duration of
the project)￿ (p. 18).
A key part of supporting motivation in service design is to o￿er suitable support to users at the
di￿erent stages of the customer journey or service blueprint (e.g. Bitner et al, 2008). Bisset (2010,
p.307) o￿ers a set of six ‘motivational design personas’ representing users at di￿erent levels of motivation,
￿the natural ‘motivational’ progression of users throughout an experience or service encounter￿ (Bisset
and Lockton, 2010, p. 16), moving from completely amotivated, through stages of extrinsic motivation
(with increasing levels of internalisation) towards fully intrinsically motivated users who ￿love...being
immersed in the process￿.
3.3 Implications for designers
 Motivation can be in￿uenced via design￿including internalisation or reframing of extrinsic motiv-
ation to intrinsic motivation.
 Deci & Ryan (1985) and Pink (2010) suggest needs that should be ful￿lled to achieve intrinsic mo-
tivation, including autonomy, competence / mastery, social relatedness and purpose, thus providing
a potential checklist for designers.
 Design has the potential to support motivation through o￿ering tailored ‘coaching’ as a user moves
through a process of engagement (after Bisset, 2010).
4 Discussion
Sections 1￿3 of this paper discuss ideas which are related, but each have their own contributions to make
to the ￿eld of design for behaviour change. The interaction between attitudes and behaviour explored
in section 1 is complex but does o￿er insights useful to designers, including raising the possibility that
while design for attitude change may lead to behaviour change, design for behaviour change may also lead
to attitude change. Design changes could cause (more) direct behaviour change, with attitude changes
resulting in the longer term (or not), depending on the persuasion ‘route’ used. Do you try to get people
to think about what they’re doing￿and perhaps persuade themselves￿or do you try to persuade them
directly, right now, in whatever way is most e￿ective?
The meanings that users read into the products and services they experience, and the emotions they
elicit (section 2) also relate to a more involved treatment of interaction behaviour, with multiple ‘semantic
layers’ re￿ecting di￿erent degrees of engagement and understanding as products perhaps become social
actors in users’ everyday lives. There are speci￿c visual and other techniques applicable to in￿uencing
and eliciting these di￿erent semantic and a￿ective e￿ects.
Finally, as touched upon in section 3, motivation for behaviour change is something potentially ad-
dressable via design, particularly the reframing of extrinsically motivating factors to more intrinsically
motivating ones, engaging users in particular behaviours for their own sake rather than solely for ‘re-
wards’. It is possible that the inverse might also be useful in some behaviour change contexts: shifting an
undesirable behaviour which is intrinsically motivated (e.g. pride in frequent replacement of consumer
11goods) to a clearly extrinsically motivated one (e.g. ￿you are wasting money￿). The motivation progres-
sion ‘journey’ explored by Bisset (2010) o￿ers designers a template for relating motivational factors and
degrees of engagement to common user experience and service design tools such as customer journey
mapping.
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